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ABSTRACT
At present, oil markets appear to be behaving in 
a fashion similar to that in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s when oil prices rose sharply over an 
extended period. Furthermore, like at that time, 
analysts are split on whether such increases 
will persist or reverse, and if so by how much. 
The present paper argues that the similarities 
between the two episodes are not as strong as 
they might appear at ﬁ   rst sight, and that the 
likelihood of sharp reversals in prices is not 
particularly great. 
There are a number of reasons in support of the 
view that it is unlikely that the ﬁ  rst two decades 
of this century will mimic the last two decades 
of the previous century. First, oil demand is 
likely to grow signiﬁ  cantly in line with strong 
economic growth in non-OECD countries. 
Second, on the supply side, OPEC is likely to 
enhance its control over markets over the next 
two decades, as supply increases in newly 
opened areas will only partially offset declining 
rates of production in other geologically mature 
non-OPEC oil regions. Moreover, while concerns 
about climate change will spur global efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions, these efforts are not 
expected to reduce oil demand. Finally, although 
there is much talk about alternative fuels, few 
of these are economically viable at the prices 
currently envisioned, and given the structural 
impediments, there is a reduced likelihood that 
the market will be able to generate sufﬁ  cient 
quantities of these alternative fuels over the 
forecast horizon. The above factors imply that 
oil prices are likely to continue to exceed the 
USD 70 to USD 90 range over the long term. 
Key words: Oil prices, Oil supply, Oil demand, 
Alternative fuels, Climate Change Policy 
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: Q41, Q42, Q435
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At present, oil markets appear to be behaving in 
a fashion similar to that in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s when oil prices rose sharply over an 
extended period. Furthermore, like at that time, 
analysts are split on whether such increases 
will persist or reverse, and if so by how much. 
The present paper argues that the similarities 
between the two episodes are not as strong as 
they might appear at ﬁ   rst sight, and that the 
likelihood of sharp reversals in prices is not 
particularly great. Two important developments 
favoured lower prices in the 1980s and 1990s: 
ﬁ   rst, higher non-OPEC oil production, and 
second, lower demand induced by the higher 
prices as well by the possibility, which was 
still high at that time, of replacing oil with coal 
and natural gas in the industrial and power-
generating sectors. Both factors weakened 
OPEC’s control over the marginal supply, 
which resulted in lower prices. The present 
outlook is different in many respects. On the 
one hand, demand remains strong, although it is 
by no means unprecedented – as some analysts 
have argued. On the other hand, supply factors 
are critical in sustaining prices. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
production of crude oil by non-OPEC countries 
has not increased since 2004 and the probability 
of substantial increases in the future is low. 
OPEC has therefore re-emerged as the main 
swing supplier and has re-established its control 
over the marginal barrel by utilising unused 
capacity and thus driving up utilisation rates.
In the future, economic activity and additions to 
OPEC capacity will have the greatest effect on 
oil prices in the long term. The long-run forecast 
for oil prices depends on OPEC’s ability to 
maintain control over the marginal supply of 
oil, particularly in view of a possible rise in
non-OPEC production and a slowdown in 
demand: the trigger of the price decline during 
the 1980s and 1990s.
There are a number of reasons in support of the 
view that it is unlikely that the ﬁ  rst two decades 
of this century will mimic the last two decades of 
the previous century. First, oil demand is likely to 
grow signiﬁ  cantly in line with strong economic 
growth in non-OECD countries, especially 
Asia, as these countries tend to be highly oil 
intensive. Second, on the supply side, OPEC is 
likely to enhance its control over markets over 
the next two decades due to anticipated changes 
in the economic, geological, technical, political 
and institutional environment. Increases in 
newly opened areas, such as the Caspian Sea 
region, will only partially offset declining rates 
of production in other geologically mature 
non-OPEC oil regions. In this context, regardless 
of the geological conditions, OPEC future 
additions to supply are likely to be small as there 
are few economic incentives to expand existing 
capacity. This limit is not simulated by most 
models. There is therefore a considerable risk 
that the resulting supply forecasts may overstate 
the amount of oil that can be delivered to the 
market – a marked distinction with respect to the 
fundamentals that prevailed in the 1980s, when 
oil prices dropped. Moreover, while concerns 
about climate change will spur global efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions, these efforts are not 
expected to reduce oil demand. Finally, while 
there is much talk about alternative fuels, few 
of these are economically viable at the prices 
currently envisioned, and given the structural 
impediments, there is a reduced likelihood that 
the market will generate signiﬁ  cant quantities 
of these alternatives over the forecast horizon. 
Technical and economic constraints on 
production imply that this supply forecast may 
overstate the amount of alternative fuels that will 
be delivered. And, even if these amounts were 
to be realised, a peak in global oil production, 
as described above, would imply that producing 
a further 7 million barrels per day (mbd) over 
25 years may not be sufﬁ  cient to ﬁ  ll the gap in 
demand. Again, both of these factors imply that 
oil prices are likely to continue to exceed the 
USD 70 to USD 90 range over the long term.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
A cursory glance at the world oil market in 
2008 reveals similarities to the oil market of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Then, as now, 
oil prices rose sharply over an extended period 
and the permanence of this rise was uncertain. 
In the early 1980s, some analysts forecast that 
oil prices would continue to rise and reach 
USD 100 per barrel in 2000. As then, some 
analysts now forecast that oil prices will remain 
high. At the same time, other analysts forecast 
that market forces would reduce oil prices 
by 2000. Similarly, several academic analyses 
now suggest that prices in excess of USD 50 
per barrel are not sustainable (see, for example, 
Gately (2007)). 
Historically, the forecast that oil prices would 
decline was correct. Oil prices dropped sharply 
in the mid-1980s and remained relatively 
low in real terms through to the late 1990s 
(see Chart 1). 
Nonetheless, there is good reason to doubt 
that current prices will drop as they did in the 
1980s and 1990s. The geological, economic, 
institutional and technological conditions that 
allowed oil prices to decline were unique to 
the last two decades of the twentieth century. 
Then, oil prices dropped because: (i) geological 
conditions allowed oil production to increase 
sharply outside OPEC; (ii) the sectoral 
composition of oil demand allowed large users 
to replace oil with coal or natural gas at low cost; 
(iii) a relatively small fraction of the world’s 
population depended on oil for their economic 
well-being; and (iv) OPEC was a much weaker 
institution.
Since these conditions no longer exist, oil prices 
are likely to remain well above the levels that 
prevailed in the 1990s over the long term, which 
we deﬁ  ne as the next 20 years. This forecast can 
be substantiated by comparing the conditions 
that allowed oil prices to decline between 1981 
and 2000 with those that prevail in 2008. In 
short, scenarios  1 in which oil prices would 
remain in the USD 70 to USD 90 range over the 
long run must include several assumptions that 
seem unlikely to be realistic: (i) substantial gains 
in oil production by non-OPEC countries which 
could offset ongoing declines; (ii) greater energy 
efﬁ  ciency to an extent that it is able to offset the 
increasing scale of economic activity; 
(iii) economic contradictions within OPEC that 
will cause it to fracture; and/or (iv) the intensive 
development of alternative forms of energy so 
that they become serious competitors to oil. The 
main objective of this paper is to put such 
assumptions to the test. 
The models run by the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) and  1 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) do not simulate prices 
endogenously. Rather, prices are exogenous, and the models 
use these prices to simulate energy demand, oil production by
non-OPEC countries and oil production by OPEC countries, 
which is simulated as the difference between the two previous 
variables. The base-case price scenario reported by the EIA in 
2008 is only slightly higher than that reported in 2007.
Chart 1 The real price of oil, as measured by the 
average FOB price for crude oil imported by the 
United States and deflated by the US GDP price index
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IEA forecast
EIA forecast
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and 
International Energy Agency (IEA).
Note: Latest observation refers to the average value for the ﬁ  rst 
three months of 2008.7
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2   WHY DID OIL 
PRICES RISE IN 
THE 1970s AND 
EARLY 1980s?
2  WHY DID OIL PRICES RISE IN THE 1970s 
AND EARLY 1980s?
During the 1950s and 1960s, an abundance of 
large oil ﬁ   elds generated considerable excess 
capacity. To maintain the supply/demand 
balance, the most important of the state-level 
organisations, the Texas Railroad Commission, 
allowed operators in Texas to pump oil from 
their  ﬁ   elds for about nine days per month. 
This translated into a utilisation rate of about 
30 percent (see Chart 2). The remaining 
70 percent could be opened quickly if an OPEC 
Member did not agree to lower prices.
In the mid-1960s, the Texas Railroad 
Commission started to allow owners to 
operate at an ever-greater fraction of capacity 
(see Chart 2). Between 1965 and 1970, the 
Texas Railroad Commission increased capacity 
utilisation from less than 30 percent to over 
70 percent. By 1973, utilisation rates in Texas 
were greater than those of OPEC. This meant 
that spare capacity in the United States and other 
non-OPEC countries  2 was less than the spare 
capacity in the OPEC Member Countries.
The loss of spare capacity in the United States 
gave OPEC control over the marginal supply of 
oil.3 In the 1970s and early 1980s, short-run 
increases in demand could be satisﬁ  ed only by 
increasing production from existing OPEC 
capacity. Similarly, OPEC countries could 
reduce short-run oil supply by shutting 
production – without spare capacity, non-OPEC 
countries could not increase production to 
offset reductions.
The ﬁ  rst example of such market power dates 
back to 1973 when OPEC stopped oil exports 
to countries that supported Israel (for example, 
the United States and the Netherlands) in the 
Yom Kippur War. The resultant panic and 
reallocation of supply caused prices to rise more 
than 250 percent from 1972 to 1974. Recognising 
this power, OPEC countries nationalised their 
ﬁ   elds, which meant that the host government 
(and their national oil companies) now controlled 
the marginal supply of oil.
The ability to inﬂ  uence oil prices by controlling 
marginal supply was demonstrated again in 
1979, when the return of Ayatollah Khomeini 
to Iran plunged the country into revolution and 
much of Iran’s oil production, about 5 million 
barrels per day (mbd), ceased. This reduction 
in production represented about 10 percent 
of world oil demand. Rather than increasing 
production to offset the shortfall, other OPEC 
countries actually reduced production. This 
raised prices by about 120 percent between 1978 
and 1982. By 1982, the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) forecast that prices would 
reach USD 100 per barrel in 2000.
During this period, no other producer outside the United States  2 
shut in signiﬁ  cant quantities of crude oil and so the fraction of 
operable capacity in Texas represented the marginal supply of 
oil. For a more detailed discussion, see Prindle (1981).
The marginal supply of oil refers to the country or group of  3 
countries that produces additional oil when oil demand increases 
and cuts back on production when oil demand declines in order 
to stabilise prices.
Chart 2 The fraction of operable capacity 
allowed to operate by the Texas Railroad 




















Note: Latest observation refers to 2007.8
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3  WHY OIL PRICES DECLINED BETWEEN 1981 
AND 2000?
Contrary to the forecast of USD 100 per barrel, 
real oil prices declined throughout much of the 
1980s and 1990s (see Chart 1). At ﬁ  rst glance, 
this decline can be explained using time-
invariant economic principles: higher prices 
increased non-OPEC oil production and reduced 
demand, both of which weakened OPEC’s 
control over the marginal supply. However, as 
described below, these changes were facilitated 
by a relatively immature resource base and 
the fact that oil could be easily replaced by 
alternatives.
DEMAND
Between the end of the Second World War 
and the price hikes of the 1970s, real oil 
prices were low and demand grew rapidly 
(see Chart 3), increasing by about 25 mbd 
between 1960 and 1970. During the 1970s, 
demand growth slowed slightly, rising by 
about 17 mbd, and during the 1980s, it slowed 
dramatically. In 1990, demand was about 
3 mbd higher than in 1980. Lower levels and 
rates of demand growth are consistent with 
the application of time-invariant economic 
principles – higher prices reduced demand via 
income and price effects. But the story is not 
that simple. Oil demand declined in a selected 
group of countries and most of that decline 
occurred in a few sectors where oil could 
be replaced with coal and/or natural gas at 
relatively low cost. 
Most notably, much of the slowdown and 
absolute reduction in demand occurred in OECD 
countries (see Chart 3). Some of the decline was 
due to slower economic growth as well greater 
efﬁ  ciency in the use of oil. Between 1979 and 
1982, OECD oil demand dropped from 
44.4 mbd to 37.8 mbd and did not exceed its 
previous peak until 1995.4, 5
An extensive literature supports the notion that higher oil prices  4 
can cause recessions (for a review, see Jones et al., (2004)).
Prior to becoming the current Chairman of the US Federal  5 
Reserve System, Ben Bernanke had written extensively on 
this subject. Bernanke et al., (1997) argues that the recessions 
of 1973, 1979-1980 and 1990 were caused by poor monetary 
policy, not by the initial oil price shock. On the euro area, 
see the article entitled “Oil prices and the euro area economy” 
in the November 2004 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin and 
the box entitled “Lessons to be drawn from oil price shocks of 
the 1970s and early 1980s in the November 2000 issues of the 
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin.
Chart 3 Global consumption of liquid fuels

























Source: US Energy Information Administration.
Note: Latest observation refers to 2007.
Chart 4 Changes in OECD oil demand by 
sector between 1985 and 1978


























Source: International Energy Agency.9
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3   WHY OIL PRICES 
DECLINED BETWEEN 
1981 AND 2000?
Not only weaker economic growth, but also 
structural issues were behind the falling oil 
demand in the OECD countries during the 1980s. 
Most of this decline occurred in the industrial, 
petroleum reﬁ  ning  6, residential and electricity-
generating sectors (see Chart 4). These sectors 
were able to curb their use of oil as it could be 
replaced by coal or natural gas. This substitution 
was relatively quick and inexpensive because 
coal and natural gas were readily available, 
the technology for using these fuels was well 
established and many boilers could be easily 
converted so that they could switch between 
fuels.
SUPPLY
The oil held in ﬁ   elds, which is used for oil 
production, is termed “proved reserves”. 
Developed countries deﬁ   ne their proved oil 
reserves conservatively. In the United States, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 
deﬁ   nes proved oil reserves as “quantities of 
oil, known to exist, that can be produced under 
current economic and technical conditions.” 
This conservative deﬁ   nition is justiﬁ  ed  by 
the fact that proved oil reserves are a critical 
determinant of the stock value of publicly 
traded oil companies. Given these rules, proved 
oil reserves of non-OPEC countries constituted 
a relatively small component of the quantities 
thought to exist.
Higher prices during the 1970s and 1980s caused 
proved oil reserves in non-OPEC countries to 
increase signiﬁ   cantly. The main mechanism 
in this was the discovery of new oil ﬁ  elds. 
Higher prices increased incentives to drill wells, 
and the resultant discovery of new oil ﬁ  elds 
increased proved reserves. This mechanism 
was highly successful because there were many
non-OPEC regions that were relatively 
unexplored and there was signiﬁ  cant potential 
to eliminate institutional constraints (see, for 
example, Broadman (1984); Oxley (1988)).
Higher oil prices also raised proved reserves by 
enhancing the viability of ﬁ  elds  previously 
considered uneconomic. For example, higher oil 
prices increased the proﬁ   tability of many 
Mexican ﬁ  elds and these ﬁ  elds were added to 
proved reserves in the 1970s. Higher prices also 
gave rise improvements in the technology used 
to produce oil. This too allowed operators to 
boost proved reserves by adding ﬁ  elds that were 
previously uneconomic. Improvements in deep 
water drilling added large quantities of oil to 
proved reserves in the North Sea. The increase 
in proved reserves led to higher rates of 
non-OPEC oil production. In total, non-OPEC 
production of conventional crude oil  7 increased 
from 25 mbd in 1973 to 38 mbd in the late 1980s 
(see Chart 5).
Much of this increase was concentrated in 
the former Soviet Union, Norway, Mexico, 
China and the United Kingdom. In the former 
Soviet Union, production increased from about 
8 mbd in 1973 to 12 mbd in 1988. During the 
same period, about 4 mbd were added in the 
Norwegian and UK sectors. Finally, China and 
Mexico each increased production by about 
The use of oil in the reﬁ  ning sector declined by about one mbd.  6 
Much of this decline was due to a reduction in reﬁ  ning capacity, 
which shrank from 49.4 mbd in 1978 to 42.1 mbd in 1985.
Conventional crude oil refers to the way in which crude oil is  7 
produced. According to the EIA, conventional crude oil is deﬁ  ned 
as crude oil “that is produced by a well drilled into a geologic 
formation in which the reservoir and ﬂ  uid characteristics permit 
the oil to readily ﬂ  ow to the wellbore”.
Chart 5 Production of conventional crude oil























Source: US Energy Information Administration.
Note: Latest observation refers to 2007.10
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2 mbd. The only signiﬁ  cant reduction occurred 
in the United States, where production declined 
by about 2 mbd between 1973 and 1990.
Increased production of crude oil was 
supplemented by increased production of natural 
gas liquids 8, which grew by about 2 mbd between 
1979 and 1990 – split almost equally between 
OPEC and non-OPEC countries. The increase 
from non-OPEC countries is consistent with 
price-taking behaviour – higher prices increased 
supply. The increase from OPEC countries was 
generated in part by difﬁ  culties that weakened 
OPEC as an institution (see Box 1). Since natural 
gas liquids do not come from oil ﬁ  elds, their 
production was not part of the quota aimed at 
limiting the production of crude oil. As described 
below, OPEC countries sought to increase the 
production of natural gas liquids to offset 
reductions in the quantity of crude oil that they 
were allowed to produce.
Natural gas liquids are liquids pumped from natural gas ﬁ  elds  8 
that can be separated from natural gas and liqueﬁ  ed in a gas 
processing plant during processing. Natural gas liquids include 
ethane, propane, butane and lease condensate. These liquids 
can be added to crude oil and put through a reﬁ  nery to generate 
reﬁ  ned petroleum products (for example, motor gasoline). As 
such, they can increase the supply of liquid fuels.
Box 1 
OPEC IN THE 1980S 
OPEC was founded in 1960 by ﬁ  ve countries 1 in order to halt the ongoing decline in oil prices 
and gain control of production from ﬁ  elds located within their national territory. At the time, 
production was controlled by multinational oil companies, which unilaterally cut the price of 
crude oil throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s. If a host country objected, multinational 
oil companies would cut production in local ﬁ  elds and increase production in another country, 
in particular the United States. Although the majority of the world’s reserves of crude oil were 
(and still are) located within the OPEC countries, the OPEC countries did not control the marginal 
supply of crude oil, as measured by spare capacity (Kaufmann, (1995)).
Instead, the marginal supply of oil resided in the United States, where production was controlled 
by the Texas Railroad Commission and other state-level organisations. These organisations were 
charged with stabilising oil prices 2, and they did so very effectively by opening and shutting 
(prorationing) operable capacity 3, which meant that supply was roughly equal to demand.
At its peak, OPEC’s control over the marginal supply of oil enabled it to set an “ofﬁ  cial” price 
for oil. OPEC set its ﬁ  rst ofﬁ  cial price for Saudi Light in 1980 at USD 28 per barrel. In 1981, 
OPEC had sufﬁ  cient power to raise the ofﬁ  cial price to USD 32. By 1982-83, the ofﬁ  cial price of 
Saudi Light had reached USD 34 per barrel.4
As described previously, these higher prices were associated with a recession, interfuel 
substitution and increases in non-OPEC production. Together, these developments reduced 
demand for OPEC oil from 30.6 mbd in 1979 to 17.5 mbd in 1983.  
1  Namely Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
2  This power was granted to them under the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935.
3  Operable capacity is the quantity of oil that can be produced from a ﬁ  eld for the next six to 18 months. It is calculated according to the 
number of wells drilled and the existing capital infrastructure for producing and transporting oil.
4  This is not to argue that OPEC was able to set prices. Analysis by Verleger (1982) and Lowinger and Ram (1984) indicate OPEC’s 
ofﬁ  cial price was “Granger caused” by spot prices.11
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3   WHY OIL PRICES 
DECLINED BETWEEN 
1981 AND 2000? In order to defend their ofﬁ  cial price, OPEC developed a quota system, which was very similar 
to the prorationing system used by the Texas Railroad Commission. The OPEC countries met on 
a quarterly basis to coordinate projections for world oil demand and non-OPEC production, and 
the difference between the two was viewed as the demand for OPEC oil. By limiting production 
to this difference and dividing this production between its Members, OPEC tried to defend its 
ofﬁ  cial price.
These efforts were relatively ineffective, however. By 1983, OPEC had agreed to limit production 
to 17.5 mbd, which was then reduced further to 16 mbd 5 in 1984. Despite these agreements, 
many OPEC countries produced oil in excess of their quota. This, as well as ongoing increases 
in non-OPEC production and continuing reductions in oil demand, meant that prices continued 
to fall. By 1985, OPEC was forced to cut its ofﬁ  cial price for Saudi Light to USD 28 per barrel. 
However, the price reductions did not curb the ongoing increases in non-OPEC production or the 
decline in world oil demand. As a result, OPEC was forced to shut-in ever increasing quantities 
of oil (see Chart 6). Most of these reductions were absorbed by Saudi Arabia, which was OPEC’s 
largest producer. Saudi Arabia became the “swing producer”, cutting production as demand 
for OPEC crude oil fell. By August 1985, Saudi Arabia was producing 2.4 mbd, down from 
10.4 mbd in August 1981. 
The combination of declining output and lower prices reduced OPEC revenues, and thus the 
efforts to sustain higher prices by shutting in production became ﬁ  nancially unsustainable. By 
December 1985, OPEC had still not reached an agreement on lower levels of output. Continued 
production in excess of quotas caused prices to decline. In an attempt to halt the price decline, 
OPEC met in February 1986, but still could not come to an agreement. By mid-1986, the nominal 
price of crude oil had dropped below USD 10, which, in real terms, was roughly equivalent to 
the prices that prevailed prior to the ﬁ  rst price hike in 1973-74.
Finally, in August 1986, OPEC reached an agreement to reign in excess production. OPEC 
would again set quotas, but it would no longer set an ofﬁ  cial price. Instead, OPEC would try to 
keep oil prices within a range that would allow OPEC producers to maintain a “fair share” of the 
world oil market.
This strategy remained in place throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, real oil 
prices remained at levels well below the 1981 peak. As recently as 2001, OPEC argued that the 
desired range for crude oil prices was USD 22 to USD 28 per barrel.
5  Actual production was 1.5 mbd higher, 17.44 mbd.12
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4  WHY HAVE OIL PRICES RISEN OVER THE 
LAST EIGHT YEARS?
Taking the USD 22 to USD 28 range as a 
starting point, oil prices have risen steadily over 
the last ten years, temporarily breaching the 
USD 140 threshold in the third quarter of 2008. 
This price is well above the previous high in 
real US dollar terms.
Several analysts argue that the current price 
increase is being driven by increasing demand, 
and they use the role of demand to differentiate 
between this price increase and the price 
increases of the 1970s and early 1980s, which 
they attribute to changes in supply. Global 
demand for oil increased from 74.0 mbd in 1998 
to 85.6 mbd in 2007 (see Chart 6). The 12 mbd 
increase should be seen against the background 
of available spare production, transportation 
and reﬁ   ning capacity. In this context, the 
12 mbd increase differs signiﬁ  cantly  from 
the increases during the 1950s, 1960s and the 
years 1988-98 when capacity bottlenecks were 
more limited. Similarly, world oil demand 
increased by about 10 mbd between 1988 and 
1998, which also was a period of relatively ﬂ  at 
oil prices.
While the role of demand cannot be denied, 
changes on the supply side appear to have 
played an even more critical role. 
DEMAND
Demand increased at a slightly accelerated 
pace during the years 2000-07 (see Chart 8). 
Chart 6 Changes relative to 1973























Source: US Energy Information Administration.
Note: Latest observation refers to 2007.
Chart 7 Global demand growth in 2006, 2007 and 2008




































Source: International Energy Agency.13
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4   WHY HAVE OIL 
PRICES RISEN 
OVER THE LAST 
EIGHT YEARS? 
The smallest contribution to this increase came 
from OECD countries – their demand rose 
from 47.8 mbd in 2000 to 49 mbd in 2007 – 
while the greatest contribution came from 
non-OECD countries, whose oil consumption 
rose from about 29 mbd in 2000 to about 36 mbd 
during the ﬁ  rst half of 2007. The majority of 
this total was located in China, where demand 
rose from about 4.8 mbd in 2000 to about 
7.8 mbd in 2007. 
STOCKS
Over the last 20 years, oil stocks have 
generally declined. For example, stocks of 
crude oil in OECD countries (other than 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the 
United States) declined from about 95 mbd in 
the mid-1980s to about 78 mbd in 2004. Most 
of this decline was associated with stagnant 
stocks, as the capacity to hold crude oil 
had steadily fallen behind demand over the 
last decade. From 2004 onwards, however, 
there was a recovery back towards about 
85 mbd in 2007.
SUPPLY
Over the last ﬁ   ve years, there has been a 
dramatic slowdown in the growth of non-OPEC 
oil production. During the 1980s, non-OPEC 
oil production grew from 32 mbd to 38 mbd. 
Production declined slightly around the 
mid-1990s due to the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union, but by 1997, Russian oil 
production had started to grow again, which 
powered a steady rise in non-OPEC production 
through to 2004.
Speciﬁ   cally, the production of crude oil by 
non-OPEC countries has not increased 
since 2004 (see Charts 5 and 6). Since 
2004, all of the increase in world 
oil demand – more than 4 mbd – 
has been supplied by crude oil pumped by OPEC 
countries and natural gas liquids produced by 
both OPEC and non-OPEC countries. This 
has allowed OPEC to re-establish control 
over the marginal barrel. Furthermore, this 
marginal barrel has come from existing OPEC 
capacity, which has driven up utilisation rates 
(see Chart 9). The lack of further gains in
non-OPEC production means that OPEC has 
supplied much of the oil needed to meet the 
recent gains in demand.
OPEC’s increasing control over the marginal 
supply of oil is reﬂ  ected in OPEC’s high rate of 
capacity utilisation. OPEC’s short-run capacity 
to produce oil has not changed signiﬁ  cantly 
over the last 30 years (see Chart 9).
Much of this capacity remained unused during 
the 1980s and 1990s and this excess exerted 
downward pressure on prices. Most of this 
excess capacity has now been reopened. As 
a result, OPEC is now producing oil at rates 
very close to its short-run capacity. As with 
any other commodity, high rates of capacity 
utilisation push up prices.
This upward price pressure has been partially 
dampened by a change in the types of crude 
oil produced. Crude oil varies in quality 
(see Box 2), which is measured by density 
(light vs heavy) and sulphur content – sour 
Chart 8 World oil demand by region
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(high sulphur content) and sweet (low sulphur 
content). Light sweet crude oils are more 
valuable than heavy sour crude oils because 
they generate a larger fraction of valuable 
products (for example, motor gasoline and jet 
fuel) and they are less damaging to reﬁ  neries. 
Since non-OPEC production has stagnated 
and OPEC has not increased capacity, recent 
growth in oil demand has forced OPEC to 
open  ﬁ   elds that produce heavy and sour 
crude oils. However, adding these crude oils 
lowered the average quality of crude oil and 
consequently also lowered – ceteris paribus – 
the average price of crude oil.
SPECULATION
In May 2008, more than half of the holders 
of positions in oil on the NYMEX were 
non-commercial players, i.e. agents not 
physically involved with oil. Non-commercial 
players have been increasingly active in 
futures oil markets, and this has raised 
questions about their potential impact on 
prices. First of all, it has to be said that
non-commercial players can be divided in 
two categories: speculators (active investors) 
who trade in the oil market on the basis of 
their supposedly better information in the 
hope of making proﬁ  ts by anticipating market 
movements in commodity prices, and index 
funds (long-term oriented, passive investors) 
which have emerged only more recently and 
reﬂ  ect the desire to add commodities to one’s 
portfolio in view of their risk/return proﬁ  le. 
For example, commodities are added to 
portfolios in order to hedge against adverse 
risks coming from oil-sensitive assets in 
the portfolio. Accordingly, these funds are 
“long-only” players; they buy oil futures and 
roll them over as expiry dates approach in 
order to avoid the delivery of the commodity.
There is currently scant evidence of the activity 
of  ﬁ   nancial players having an impact on oil 
prices. A formal assessment is hampered by 
data and methodological problems, including 
the difﬁ   culty of identifying speculative and 
hedging-related trades. OPEC countries argue 
that market fundamentals alone cannot account 
for the rise in oil prices. In March 2008, the 
Saudi Arabian Minister for Petroleum and 
Box 2
THE QUALITY OF CRUDE OIL 
Crude oil varies in density (light vs heavy) and sulphur content, sour (high sulphur content) and 
sweet (low sulphur content). The density of a crude oil is indicated by its API gravity index, 
which is an arbitrary scale that expresses the gravity or density of liquid petroleum products 
relative to water. Larger numbers indicate lighter grades of crude oil, which have a value of 
38o or above. A value of 22o or below indicates heavy crude, while values between 22o and 38o 
indicate medium-grade oil.
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4   WHY HAVE OIL 
PRICES RISEN 
OVER THE LAST 
EIGHT YEARS? 
Mineral Resources, Ali Al Naimi, argued that 
“speculation in futures markets is determining 
prices”. However, OPEC argues that investors 
have allocated a larger portion of their portfolio 
to crude oil and that the large ﬂ  ow of capital 
into the oil market has forced prices higher. 
It therefore appears to be arguing that index 
funds are generating additional demand. In our 
opinion, however, there is no sound evidence 
to corroborate this argument. First of all, index 
funds do not produce any additional physical 
demand, since they are not interested in the 
delivery of oil. As the delivery date of the future 
contracts approaches, spot and future prices 
have to converge, and the spot price is indeed 
determined by the supply and demand curves of 
producers and consumers.
Furthermore, although it is true that the assets 
managed by commodity index funds have 
surged since 2001, from USD 10 billion to more 
than USD 200 billion, the overall size of index 
funds is still very small relative to the size of the 
physical market. Compared with the physical oil 
market, the size of index funds is equivalent to 
only 80 million barrels, which is less than the 
world oil demand for one day, and 0.26% of 
annual demand. It therefore seems very unlikely 
that index funds have had a sizeable impact on 
oil prices.
Turning to the role of speculators, we ﬁ  rst 
remark that it is true that much of the increase 
in oil prices between 2005 and 2007 was 
associated with a change in futures markets 
from backwardation to contango (see Chart 10).
Throughout much of the 1990s and the early 
part of this decade, futures markets were 
in backwardation. This backwardation was 
sustained in part by OPEC’s strategy to maintain 
prices and speculators sensed that the strategy 
would not work. In order to maintain prices, 
OPEC quotas were designed to match supply 
and demand. Adhering to the quotas meant that 
there was little extra oil to build inventories. 
Low inventories supported prices in the near 
term by keeping the market dependent on 
current production. Furthermore, backwardation 
was self-reinforcing because when the market is 
in backwardation, there is no incentive to build 
stocks. Far-month contracts remained lower 
than near-month contracts because speculators 
expected that increased levels of non-OPEC 
production and a breakdown in OPEC cohesion 
would generate excess supplies in the future.
Between late 2004 and mid-2007, prices of near 
and far-month contracts changed such that the 
market was in contango. This created market 
conditions that tend to boost prices but it also 
created an opportunity for speculators. Once the 
price difference between a near-month contract 
and a far-month contract exceeds the physical 
cost of storage, more expensive future month 
prices give ﬁ  rms and speculators an incentive 
to build stocks – it becomes less expensive for 
ﬁ  rms to buy oil now and pay the storage costs 
than to contract for deliveries of more expensive 
oil in the future. Furthermore, this arbitrage 
opportunity can be “rolled forward” which is 
what added to the upward pressure on oil prices 
between 2005 and 2006.
Since March 2007, speculative pressure on 
prices has been indicated by high levels of fund 
activity in crude markets, with the data from 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) showing that speculators in the NYMEX 
Chart 10 Difference between the four-month 
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crude oil market have been positioned net long, 
with increasingly high and volatile positions 
(see Chart 11). Yet, it should be noted that in the 
past months this position has changed despite 
surging prices, and recently non-commercial 
players have assumed a net short position for 
the ﬁ  rst time since 2007.
In any case, an econometrically sound formal 
assessment is hampered by data and 
methodological problems, including the 
difﬁ   culty of identifying speculative and 
hedging-related trades. Despite such problems, 
however, a number of studies seem to suggest 
that speculation has not systematically 
contributed to higher oil prices (see IMF 
(2006)) as they show that causality runs from 
prices to changes in speculative positions. In 
fact, although many transactions are described 
as speculative, they may reﬂ  ect a precautionary 
desire to hedge exposures in the face of 
uncertainty.9
Other studies that use more disaggregated data 
conﬁ  rm that speculation does not drive oil prices. 
NYMEX staff found that hedge funds trading 
on the NYMEX is a non-disruptive source of 
liquidity to the market and that the positions and 
trading volumes of hedge funds have a neutral 
impact on price levels and a negligible inﬂ  uence 
on volatility. Using a unique set of data from the 
CFTC, Haigh, Hranaiova and Overdahl (2005) 
ﬁ  nd that speculators (hedge funds) do not change 
their positions as frequently as commercial 
operators (oil companies that use derivatives 
to hedge), that there is a signiﬁ  cant  negative 
correlation between speculative positions and 
the positions of commercial operators, and that 
it is speculators who are providing liquidity to 
commercial operators and not vice versa. 
For example, concerns about future shortages could lead to a  9 
genuine desire among consumers to hold increased inventories, 
which would push up prices, everything else being equal.
Chart 11 Speculative positions and oil price
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The long-run forecast (15 to 20 years) for oil 
prices depends heavily on OPEC’s ability to 
maintain control over the marginal supply of 
oil. As described below, market fundamentals 
suggest that OPEC will be able to maintain 
its control over the marginal supply of oil and 
therefore avoid a rerun of the 1980s and 1990s 
during which rising non-OPEC production and 
slowing demand diminished OPEC’s control. 
First, oil demand is likely to grow signiﬁ  cantly 
in line with strong economic growth in 
non-OECD countries, especially Asia, as these 
countries tend to be highly oil intensive. 
Second, on the supply side, OPEC is likely to 
enhance its control over markets over the next 
two decades due to anticipated changes in the 
economic, geological, technical, political and 
institutional environment. Increases in newly 
opened areas, such as the Caspian Sea region, 
will only partially offset declining rates of 
production in other geologically mature non-
OPEC oil regions. In this context, regardless 
of the geological conditions, OPEC future 
additions to supply are likely to be small, as 
there are few economic incentives to expand 
existing capacity. This limit is not simulated by 
most models. There is therefore a considerable 
risk that the resulting supply forecasts may 
overstate the amount of oil that can be delivered 
to the market – a marked distinction with 
respect to the fundamentals that prevailed in 
the 1980s, when oil prices dropped. Moreover – 
as for non-OPEC procedures – while concerns 
about climate change will spur global efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions, these efforts are not 
expected to reduce oil demand. Finally, while 
there is much talk about alternative fuels, few 
of these are economically viable at the prices 
currently envisioned, and given the structural 
impediments, there is a reduced likelihood that 
the market will generate signiﬁ  cant quantities of 
these alternatives over the forecast horizon.
We illustrate changes in oil demand,
non-OPEC oil production, OPEC production 
and the production of alternative fuels with 
simulations generated by models run by the 
EIA and the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). These are among the few models with 
a forecast horizon that is consistent with the 
20-year horizon used here. Furthermore, these 
simulations are available to the public and are 
frequently described in the media. Most of the 
ﬁ   gures that follow are derived from the EIA 
simulation because it reports annual values, as 
opposed to the ﬁ  ve-year interval values reported 
by the IEA. Nonetheless, the general changes 
simulated by the IEA are also reported to 
illustrate that the simulations generated by the 
two models are very similar. 
DEMAND
Oil demand is forecast to expand steadily over 
the next two decades. Growth will be driven 
by demand increases in non-OECD countries 
outpacing stagnant levels of demand in OECD 
countries. These differences are largely the result 
of income effects relative to price effects. In 
non-OECD countries, income gains associated 
with economic development will outstrip the 
price effects associated with higher oil prices.
Forecasts generated by both the EIA and the 
IEA currently expect oil demand to grow over 
Chart 12 Oil demand forecast
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the next two decades. For example, the EIA 
forecasts that global demand for liquid fuels 
will reach 118 mbd by 2030 (see Chart 12). 
Similarly, the IEA forecasts that oil demand 
will reach 116 mbd by 2030. The growth rates 
needed to reach these levels are relatively 
low compared with historic levels. To reach 
116 mbd in 2030, global demand must grow by 
about 1.3 percent per year. Although this seems 
like a slow growth rate (as described below, 
there is a considerable risk that oil demand 
will grow faster than projected), sustained 
growth generates a large absolute increase in 
oil demand.
Demand continues to grow because, for most 
non-OECD countries, income effects outweigh 
efﬁ   ciency gains associated with improved 
technology and/or higher prices. It is also 
continuing to rise despite some early studies 
suggesting that demand for oil (and other natural 
resources and environmental quality) can be 
modelled using an “Environmental Kuznets 
Curve” (EKC). According to the EKC hypothesis, 
demand for natural resources and/or the emission 
of pollutants increases as income rises. These 
increases slow down as income rises, and beyond 
a certain “turning point”, further income gains 
reduce demand for natural resources and/or 
the emission of wastes (Grossman and Krueger 
(1991); Shaﬁ   k and Bandyopadhyay (1992)). 
This generates an inverted u-shaped curve 
for the relationship between income and oil 
use. The turning point and subsequent decline 
prompt some analysts to forecast that economic 
development will slow growth in oil demand, 
and perhaps cause it to decline. 
The notion of an EKC for energy use in general, 
and oil use in particular, is supported by some 
initial empirical studies (for example, 
Bruyn et al. (1998); Schmalensee et al. (1998); 
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995)). Schmalensee 
et al. (1998), for example, ﬁ   nd that energy 
intensity declines as GDP per capita grows 
beyond about  USD 10,000 (in 1985 prices). 
But these results are contradicted by more 
recent ﬁ  ndings that indicate that the decline in 
intensity is caused by model misspeciﬁ  cation. 
Empirical estimates for the EKC are often 
generated by ﬁ  tting observations to a quadratic 
function. The turning point is often greater than 
the largest observed value for income. Without 
observations on the right side of the turning 
point, it is possible to model the relationship 
between income and oil use with a semi-log or 
double-log speciﬁ   cation (as opposed to a 
quadratic speciﬁ   cation). Richmond and 
Kaufmann (2006) use these three speciﬁ  cations 
to estimate the relationship between energy use 
and GDP per capita from observations made 
between 1973 and 1997 for 36 countries. Tests 
of the predictive accuracy of out-sample 
forecasts generated by the three models indicate 
that the semi-log model is the best descriptor of 
the relationship between energy use and GDP 
per capita in non-OECD countries. This would 
imply that there is no turning point. Richmond 
and Kaufmann (2006) ﬁ   nd that a quadratic 
model is the best descriptor of the relationship 
between GDP per capita and energy use in 
OECD countries. But even this support is 
invalidated by omitted price effects – including 
energy prices- in models of the relationship 
between GDP per capita and energy use in 
OECD countries and hence indicates that a 
double-log speciﬁ   cation generates the best 
description of the relationship (Richmond and 
Kaufmann (2007)). Again, this would imply 
that there is no turning point. Nor will a turning 
point in the relationship between income and 
intensity of use automatically generate a 
reduction in oil use. Even if the turning point 
found by Schmalensee et al. (1998) is correct, 
the scale effect associated with increases in 
GDP (associated with gains in GDP per capita 
and population) more than offsets the reduction 
in energy intensity such that total energy use 
rises. The importance of scale relative to 
efﬁ  ciency is demonstrated by an econometric 
analysis of sectoral oil demand in 133 countries 
(Kaufmann and Shiers (2008)). The dependent 
variable is oil demand by sector 10; independent 
The ten sectors analysed, as deﬁ   ned by the IEA, include  10 
(1) agriculture, (2) commercial, (3) electricity, (4) heat and 
power, (5) residential, (6) transportation, (7) other transportation, 
(8) manufacturing, (9) non-energy, and (10) bunkers.19
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variables include GDP, population, as well as 
linear, squared and cubic terms for GDP per 
capita. In this speciﬁ   cation, GDP per capita 
should be interpreted as non-linear interactive 
terms for GDP and population. Coefﬁ  cients 
associated with GDP per capita show two 
turning points; sectoral oil use grows with 
initial gains in income, declines with further 
gains, but then rises again as income reaches 
higher levels (see Table 1). The conclusion of 
such analyses is therefore that, regardless of 
the income levels and at odds with the EKC 
hypothesis associated with these turning points, 
population and GDP effects are predominant. 
In these circumstances, increases in GDP or 
population push up oil demand.
Given the importance of scale, much of the 
income and population-driven increases in 
global oil demand originate in non-OECD 
countries. For example, the IEA forecasts 
that more than 70 percent of the increase in 
world oil demand will originate in non-OECD 
countries, so that by 2030 non-OECD countries 
will eventually consume more oil than OECD 
countries (see Chart 12). Much of this growth 
in demand will be concentrated in China and 
India. Together, these countries are home to 
about a third of the world’s population and their 
income has been growing rapidly over the last 
decade. In China, real GDP has increased by 
about 10 percent each year since 1990.
A closer look at projections for oil demand 
indicates that demand could grow faster than 
forecast. For example, the EIA forecasts that 
Russian oil demand will grow 0.8 percent 
annually between 2005 and 2030, reaching 
3.4 mbd by 2030, which is lower than the 1993 
level of consumption of 3.8 mbd. The fact that 
25 years of economic growth (powered in part 
by high oil prices) will not cause Russian oil 
consumption to exceed the levels of the early 
1990s suggests that the forecast for Russian oil 
demand is very low. The IEA forecasts Russian 
oil demand to grow slightly faster at 1 percent 
each year until 2030.
Even more signiﬁ  cant is the fact that the EIA 
forecasts Chinese oil demand to only grow from 
6.9 mbd in 2007 to 15.0 mbd by 2030, which 
corresponds to an average annual growth rate 
of 3.2 percent: a very substantial reduction in 
the annual change, which is hard to justify from 
previous trends (see Chart 13). Similarly, the 
IEA forecasts Chinese oil demand growth to 
drop to 3.4 percent a year. 
There is reason to doubt that Chinese oil 
demand growth will drop as dramatically as 
forecast by the EIA and IEA. An econometric 
analysis performed by Gately (2007) indicates 
Table 1 Impact of GDP per capita 
(in constant USD 2000) for the sectoral 





Agriculture 1,010  2,510
Bunkers  1) --
Commercial 68,000  122,000
Electricity 42,100  120,000
Heat and power  5,420  17,500
Manufacturing 90,600  237,000
Non-energy 4,630  49,800
Other transportation  2) 12,000  -
Residential 8,940  22,400
Transportation - -
1) Coefﬁ   cients associated with income are not statistically 
different from zero.
2) Coefﬁ  cient associated with income cubed is not statistically 
signiﬁ  cant.
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that the Chinese automobile ﬂ  eet will increase 
20-fold by 2030 (the global ﬂ  eet is expected to 
double). Currently, China consumes 1.2 mbd 
of motor fuel. The 20-fold increase in the 
automobile  ﬂ   eet implies a 23 mbd increase 
in motor fuel consumption, even if fuel 
consumption per car remains constant. This 
may be a conservative assumption as motor 
fuel use per car responds strongly to initial 
income gains (this increase may, however, be 
offset by gains in energy efﬁ  ciency). On the 
production side of the economy, increased 
output and exports imply similar increases 
in the demand to transport raw materials and 
ﬁ  nished goods. 
The apparent underestimation of oil demand 
growth in non-OECD countries is an important 
factor that could result in a downside bias in 
global demand growth forecasts. In fact, income 
and demand elasticities differ between OECD 
and non-OECD countries, and differential 
rates of demand growth will support higher 
prices. Both theory and empirical analyses 
indicate that income elasticities in non-OECD 
countries are greater than in OECD countries. 
Conversely, own-price elasticities are greater 
in OECD countries. These differences suggest 
that, as non-OECD countries are responsible 
for a greater fraction of global oil demand, 
the average income elasticity will rise and the 
average price elasticity will fall. These changes 
will tend to increase oil demand and make it less 
sensitive to higher prices, both of which support 
higher oil prices.
The structural change in the composition of 
OECD oil demand associated with the price 
increases of the 1970s and 1980s reduced the 
price sensitivity of OECD oil demand. The 
fraction of oil demand in sectors sensitive to oil 
prices decreased signiﬁ  cantly between 1974 and 
2004 (see Charts 14(a) and (b)).
The manufacturing and residential sectors 
are currently responsible for a much smaller 
fraction of ﬁ  nal oil demand than before. Most 
oil is instead consumed by the transportation 
and non-energy sectors. In both of these sectors, 
it will be difﬁ   cult to replace oil with other 
forms of energy, which will limit the downward 
pressure on prices that could be generated by 
lower demand. This general pattern is already 
is present in developing countries where 
transportation and non-energy uses accounted 
for 64 percent of total energy use in 2004, as 
opposed to 50 percent in 1974 (see Charts 14(a) 
and 14(b)).
Chart 14 Sectoral composition of OECD
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These difﬁ   culties are best illustrated by the 
transportation sector’s dependence on oil use. 
The need for liquid fuels in the transportation 
sector means that they cannot be replaced by 
coal or natural gas. Eventually, electricity may 
be able to be used as a replacement for motor 
fuel, provided there are signiﬁ  cant advances in 
battery technology. But, given that there has 
been limited progress in improving battery life 
over the past two decades, using electricity to 
power a signiﬁ  cant portion of the world’s ﬂ  eet 
of motor vehicles within the next two decades 
seems unlikely.
The relatively small impact of higher energy 
prices and advanced technology on oil demand 
is consistent with results generated by three 
price scenarios recently run by the EIA.11 Prices 
for 2030 range from USD 100 per barrel (high 
price scenario) through USD 60 (reference 
scenario) to USD 36 (low price scenario). The 
respective rates of world oil consumption are 
128 mbd in the low price scenario, 117.4 mbd 
in the reference scenario and 101 mbd in the 
high price scenario. These differences imply a 
small own-price elasticity of demand. Crude oil 
prices in the high price scenario are about 
200 percent higher than in the low price 
scenario, while oil demand is about 27 percent 
lower. This would imply an own-price elasticity 
of about -0.13. Elasticities calculated using the 
reference scenario are similar, and these values 
are consistent with those reported in the peer 
review literature (for example, Narayan and 
Smyth (2007); Eltony (1999)).
Small price elasticities imply that very large 
price increases would be needed to offset the 
effect of rising income on oil demand. Since 
price elasticities are small, and international 
changes in the composition of oil demand 
reduce the global average, rising energy prices 
are unlikely to generate reductions in oil 
demand that would be sufﬁ  ciently large to cut 
into OPEC demand as they did in the 1980s. 
This implies that OPEC may be able to sustain 
higher oil prices without causing a reduction 
in oil demand that would diminish its control 
over the marginal supply.
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Forecasts for oil demand depend partly on 
the possibility of an international agreement 
to limit carbon emissions. Historically, oil 
producers such as OPEC have been hostile to 
such agreements, as they fear they could spark 
a reduction in oil demand. As described below, 
coal producers are instead likely to bear the 
brunt of such agreements, with rather limited 
effects on oil demand.
At ﬁ  rst glance, oil demand could be signiﬁ  cantly 
depressed by efforts to limit emissions of 
carbon dioxide, which are produced by the 
combustions of fossil fuels and are at the root of 
climate change. The reason for this belief is that, 
globally, oil use accounts for about 37 percent 
of primary energy use (2005) and is responsible 
for about 39 percent of carbon emissions. 
Different fossil fuels emit different quantities 
of carbon per heat unit and oil is not the largest 
“pollutant”. In particular, burning one thousand 
BTUs (BTUs measure the energy content of a 
fuel) of coal emits 26 grams of carbon dioxide, 
whereas one thousand BTUs of oil emit 
21.4 grams of carbon (and 14.5 grams of carbon 
using natural gas). These quantities are ﬁ  xed by 
the chemical composition of the fuel.
Price-based mechanisms to reduce carbon 
emissions, such as a carbon tax, will probably 
have little impact on oil demand. Carbon taxes 
raise the price of fuels based on the amount of 
carbon emitted per heat unit burned. Given the 
relative emission rates, carbon taxes raise the 
price of coal by the greatest amount, while oil 
and natural gas prices rise by smaller amounts 
(see Table 2). 
The percentage increase in coal prices is even 
greater because coal is much less expensive than 
oil. For example, a USD 1000 carbon tax raises 
the price of coal delivered to electric utilities by 
about 150 percent while it raises oil prices only 
by about 27 percent (see Table 2).
Oil prices are exogenous in the model simulated by the EIA. 11 22
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The increase in energy prices relative to capital 
and labour will reduce energy use, including oil 
use. But some of this reduction will be offset by 
changes in the relative price of energy, which 
will prompt consumers to replace coal with 
oil and/or natural gas. As such, a carbon tax 
may actually increase oil demand. These gains 
may be offset by substituting oil for natural 
gas (Kaufmann, 1991(a)). In the light of these 
directions for interfuel substitution, price-based 
climate change policies will have relatively little 
impact on oil demand.
Similarly, oil demand will probably be relatively 
unaffected by policies aimed at reducing 
emissions with a cap and trade system. With 
such a strategy, governments manage permits 
that entitle permit holders to emit carbon 
dioxide. Owners can use a permit to emit carbon 
dioxide or can sell the permit if he/she can 
reduce emissions at a cost lower than the market 
price for the permit.
The feasibility of a cap and trade system is 
determined in part by the number of participants 
and their technical sophistication. For the 
system to succeed, emissions must be monitored 
to ensure that those who emit carbon dioxide 
have the requisite permits. To ensure efﬁ  ciency, 
participants must be able to make economically 
rational decisions to buy or sell permits and 
must have access to capital that would support 
economically rational investments to reduce 
emissions.
The totality of these requirements implies 
that a cap and trade system is most likely to 
include only large energy consumers in the 
manufacturing and/or electricity–generating 
sectors for example. These sectors use large 
quantities of coal relative to oil and natural 
gas. The quantity of coal (measured in heat 
units) used by OECD countries in the industrial 
and electricity-generating sectors is about 
ten times greater than the amount of oil used. 
These relative rates support the notion that 
efforts to reduce carbon emissions will be 
achieved by reducing coal use – climate policy 
will therefore have relatively little impact on
oil consumption.
CONVENTIONAL CRUDE OIL SUPPLY
IEA and EIA projections that 30 mbd of 
additional crude production will be needed by 
2030 present a formidable challenge given that 
many oil-producing areas are now considered 
“mature” and so production is expected to 
remain stable or decline. To satisfy growing 
demand, both non-OPEC and OPEC countries 
will need to produce additional quantities of 
conventional crude oil, and these quantities 
will need to be supplemented by the production 
of alternative fuels. As described below, it is 
generally considered unlikely that the resource 
base will support signiﬁ  cant gains in non-OPEC 
production. Assuming that OPEC does have 
sufﬁ  cient supplies, there are no strong economic 
incentives for it to expand production. Instead, 
the ability to match supply and demand may 
depend on the technical improvements and 
capital investments that are needed to expand 
the production of alternative fuels (see the 
next section).
NON-OPEC PRODUCTION 
Both the IEA and the EIA forecast non-OPEC 
production to increase over the period 2005-30. 
The EIA forecasts production of both crude oil 
Table 2 Effects of a USD 1000 per metric ton carbon tax on the price of fossil fuels delivered 










Coal 26.0 USD 2.60 USD 1.69  154
Oil 21.4 USD 2.14 USD 7.85 27
Natural gas 14.5 USD 1.45 USD 6.34 23
Source: US Energy Information Agency.23
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and natural gas liquids to increase by 1.0 percent 
each year. The IEA forecasts an annual gain of 
about 0.8 percent over the same period. As a 
result, the EIA forecasts production to increase 
by about 14 mbd, from 47.3 mbd in 2005 to 
61.5 mbd in 2030 (see Chart 15). 
Where should this extra production come 
from? It is certainly unlikely that signiﬁ  cant 
increases in non-OPEC production will 
originate in areas that are presently not known 
to contain signiﬁ  cant quantities of oil. Most 
of the world’s sedimentary rock formations 
(the only type of rock that can hold crude 
oil) have been already explored using seismic 
techniques. These techniques cannot identify 
oil in situ, but they can identify formations that 
have the potential to hold signiﬁ  cant quantities 
of oil. Based on seismic information (and the 
results of drilling wells), both the EIA and IEA 
forecasts indicate that the largest increases in 
non-OPEC production will occur in areas 
around the Caspian Sea. Oil production is 
forecast to increase in other areas, but the pace 
of this increase is expected to be slower and oil 
output is expected to be smaller (see Table 3). 
For example, the EIA forecasts smaller 
increases in production in the non-OPEC areas 
of Africa and South America. Even smaller 
increases are forecast in the United States.
On the other hand, there are other areas in 
which resource depletion is expected to reduce 
production. For example, the EIA and IEA 
forecast that OECD oil production will decline 
in Europe, as well as in Canada, Mexico 
and China.
Geological considerations imply that much 
of the risk associated with the forecast for a 
14 mbd increase in non-OPEC production lies 
on the downside, i.e. that production is likely 
to be less than forecast. Unlike the 1980s and 
1990s, there are few unexplored sedimentary 
rock formations. This is likely to reduce 
discoveries relative to the 1980s and 1990s. 
This difference is not captured by the EIA or 
IEA models because they do not explicitly 
consider the resource base and/or tend to 
overstate the potential for higher prices to elicit 
additional production. 
This bias is especially apparent in forecasts 
for production in two of the largest non-OPEC 
regions, namely the United States and the North 
Sea. The EIA model forecasts US production to 
Table 3 Projections for oil production 
(million barrels per day)
2005 2030 Difference
Non-OPEC 47.3 61.5 14.2
of which Asia 2.4 3.3 0.9
Caspian Sea 2.1 5.7 3.6
South America 4.1 6.8 2.7
USA 8.6 9.2 0.6
OECD Europe 5.9 2.7 -3.2
Source: US Energy Information administration.
Chart 15 Projection for non-OPEC oil 
production
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rise, i.e. a reversal of its long-term downward 
trend, with US production of crude oil declining 
from 11 mbd in 1973 to 6.8 mbd in 2004 
(see Chart 16). One of the few differences 
between the two forecasts is that the IEA does 
not forecast US production to rise.
Just after the rise in real oil prices during the 
early 1970s, analysts in the US Department of 
Energy (Federal Energy Administration (1974)) 
and the National Petroleum Council (1971) 
forecast that higher prices would reverse the 
decline and boost production to new all-time 
highs. Although real oil prices exceeded the 
threshold forecast to generate a new all-time 
high, production continued to decline. With 
the beneﬁ  t of hindsight, the continued decline 
in production can be explained by econometric 
analyses that explicitly account for changes 
in the resource base (for example, Kaufmann 
(1991(b)); Kaufmann and Cleveland (2001)). 
These analyses indicate that the United States 
has exhausted many of its largest ﬁ  elds and it is 
not possible to offset the decline in these ﬁ  elds 
by increasing production in ﬁ  elds that are one or 
two orders of magnitude smaller.
A similar bias is likely to be responsible for 
the forecast of greater production over the next 
25 years. Production in the United States has 
been declining because resource depletion is 
reducing production in the giant onshore ﬁ  elds 
that generate most of the United States’ output – 
the forecast does not include production from 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which is 
currently off-limits. Even if this area is opened, 
the US Geological Survey (1998) indicates that 
a decade would pass before 1-2 mbd could be 
produced for about a decade. Such an increase 
would largely offset the ongoing decline 
in production from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska 
(United States). Instead, reversing the decline 
would require very large increases in offshore 
production. While gains in these ﬁ  elds  are 
possible, it is very unlikely that they will more 
than offset losses elsewhere.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the forecast for 
increased production of natural gas liquids (by 
increasing the production of natural gas) will 
be realised. Over the last decade, production 
of both natural gas and natural gas liquids has 
declined. Again, assuming an increase in US 
production of natural liquids would imply a 
complete trend reversal; a long-term decline 
would need to be replaced by a long-term 
increase.
The improbability of these reversals is 
illustrated by the initial failure of the forecast. 
The EIA forecast US production of crude oil 
and natural gas liquids to rise from 8 mbd in 
2006 to 8.6 mbd in 2007, which was the ﬁ  rst 
year of the forecast. Observations indicate 
that US production in 2007 increased by 
0.04 mbd relative to 2006. And much of this 
small increase may have been associated with 
the absence of hurricanes. To sum up, even the 
short-term forecast of an increase in production 
has proved to be too optimistic. 
Similar downside risk exists in the forecast 
for the production of liquid fuels from 
OECD-Europe. The EIA forecast calls 
for a net reduction of 3 mbd over the next 
25 years, while the IEA forecasts a reduction 
of 3.3 mbd. Such reductions are signiﬁ  cant, but 
recent declines in production indicate that the 
reduction could be more severe. As mentioned 
Chart 16 Projection of oil production in the 
United States
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previously, production of crude oil in both 
Norway and the United Kingdom has already 
dropped more than 1 mbd relative to its peak. 
These declines are expected to continue.
Higher prices are also unlikely to generate a 
signiﬁ  cant increase in production. Analyses that 
account for the resource base indicate relatively 
small own-price elasticities of supply in 
non-OPEC countries, with most estimates being 
between 0.1 and 0.2 (Kaufmann (1991(b)), 
Ramcharran (2002)).
OPEC PRODUCTION
Even if forecasts for increasing rates of non-
OPEC production prove to be accurate, this 
increase will be less than the projected increases 
in demand. To close the gap, OPEC will have 
to increase production. For example, the 
EIA forecasts OPEC production to increase 
from 33 mbd in 2005 to 54 mbd in 2030 
(see Chart 17). The IEA forecasts production to 
reach 56 mbd.
Although the forecast for continued growth 
looks like a linear extrapolation of gains since 
1985, future gains will have to be of a different 
nature. Most notably, while gains since 1985 
have been supported by the reopening of existing 
capacity, future gains will require investments 
in new capacity.
OPEC’s willingness to boost production by 
expanding capacity, however, is far from evident 
and most importantly is largely ignored by 
long-run simulations. Most models extrapolate 
OPEC’s role as the marginal supplier. Using 
this assumption, modellers generate exogenous 
price scenarios and use these prices to forecast 
demand and non-OPEC production (non-OPEC 
producers are assumed to act as price takers). 
OPEC is assumed to balance the market by 
producing enough oil to close the gap. However, 
such behaviour may not be consistent with the 
long-run economic interests of OPEC. OPEC 
has not increased its operable capacity over 
the last 30 years, including the last ﬁ  ve years, 
over which utilisation rates have increased 
signiﬁ   cantly. As explained previously, higher 
utilisation rates put upward pressure on prices. 
Now that OPEC is operating near full capacity, 
a critical issue for long-term price forecasts 
is whether OPEC will increase capacity at a 
sufﬁ  ciently rapid rate. The preliminary answer 
seems to be negative.
In the short term, OPEC’s willingness to expand 
capacity is determined by the extent to which 
the negative effects of lower utilisation rates 
are compensated for by greater oil demand 
and lower rates of production by non-OPEC 
countries. To evaluate these effects, Dees et 
al. (2008) simulate the effects of an increase 
in OPEC capacity using their world oil market 
model. A 5 percent increase in OPEC capacity 
lowers utilisation rates, which in turn reduces 
oil prices by about 12 percent. The reduction in 
prices increases the call for OPEC oil by about 
2 percent. Most of this increase is associated with 
higher oil demand, although some is associated 
with lower production by non-OPEC countries. 
Higher demand for OPEC oil raises utilisation 
rates, but not back to the levels that prevailed 
prior to the increase. Under these conditions, oil 
prices decline by about 10 percent and revenues 
fall by about 8 percent (see Chart 18). Such 
losses reduce the likelihood of OPEC expanding 
capacity. 
Gately (1995; 2007) explores the long-term 
effects of increases in OPEC capacity on the 
Chart 17 Projection for OPEC production 
(crude oil, lease condensate, and natural 
gas liquids)
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present value of OPEC revenues. Results 
indicate that OPEC’s long-run interests 
are not maximised by simply increasing 
capacity to accommodate low prices and 
growing demand. By analysing a series of 
market-adaptive strategies (as indicated by the 
period 1979-86, it is very difﬁ   cult to target 
an ofﬁ   cial price), Gately (2007) ﬁ  nds  that 
expanding production to accommodate global 
demand does not maximise long-term revenues. 
A better strategy would be for OPEC to target a 
constant share of non-OPEC oil demand and to 
allow oil prices to rise.
HOW MUCH OIL REMAINS?
Regardless of OPEC’s economic willingness 
to expand capacity, its physical ability to do 
so depends on the geological resource base. In 
short, can the levels of oil demand described 
above be met by the quantity of oil that remains 
to be produced? This quantity often is used to 
determine when the world will “run out” of 
oil. This date, however, is largely irrelevant 
because the world will not run out of oil 
overnight. Engineering and economic aspects 
of oil production dictate that production will 
decline over an extended period.
Given this “ending”, the date on which 
production peaks is critical. Prior to the peak, 
production can be expanded to accommodate 
growing demand at relatively low cost. Beyond 
the peak, production declines irrespective of 
price increases or improvements in technology. 
The importance of this peak is illustrated by 
the history of crude oil production in the lower 
48 states of the United States and the North 
Sea. In the United States, production increased 
nearly 10-fold between 1900 and 1970, even 
though real oil prices remained largely constant 
(see Chart 19). 
After 1970, oil production declined even though 
prices rose signiﬁ  cantly and technology became 
ever more efﬁ   cient. A similar, albeit shorter, 
downward trend is currently ongoing in the 
North Sea, despite the signiﬁ   cant increase in 
prices since 2000.
There is considerable uncertainty about the date 
on which the global production of conventional 
crude oil will peak. Using techniques that ﬁ  t 
logistic curves to cumulative production (the 
so-called Hubbert curve), some analysts argue 
that global production has already peaked or that 
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Chart 19 Oil production, the real price of oil 
and cost of producing a barrel of crude oil 
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it will peak shortly (see, for example, Deffeyes 
(2005); Campbell (1998)). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, the production of conventional 
crude oil fell from 73.5 mbd in 2006 to 73.2 mbd 
in 2007. Other analysts argue that this decline 
was caused by OPEC’s reluctance to increase 
capacity, and that OPEC could expand global 
production for decades to come if they chose 
to do so. In line with this argument, production 
during the ﬁ  rst three months of 2008 was about 
1 mbd greater than during the same period in 
2006 and 2007.
There is considerable uncertainty about the 
amount of oil that will ultimately be recovered 
from the ground. Estimates vary from less than 
1 trillion barrels to nearly four trillion barrels 
(see Chart 20).
As of 1 January 2005, about 1 trillion barrels 
of oil have been pumped. This implies that if 
pessimistic estimates are correct, the world will 
produce another 0.8 trillion barrels. Another 
2.9 trillion barrels will be produced if the most 
optimistic estimate proves to be correct.
Surprisingly, this 4-fold difference implies 
only a relatively small difference in the date 
that global oil production is likely to peak. This 
effect is described using a relatively simple 
algorithm that generates production paths which 
are based on assumptions regarding: (1) the 
amount of oil that remains; (2) the growth rate 
of demand; and (3) the rate at which production 
declines. In 53 of the 64 scenarios analysed 
by Kaufmann and Shiers (2008), the date of 
the peak is estimated to be between 2009 and 
2031 depending on the amount of oil remaining. 
For example, the peak year is delayed from 
2013 to 2032 if the amount of oil remaining 
is raised from 0.8 trillion to 2.9 trillion barrels 
(see Chart 21). 
If the quantity of oil that remains is held constant 
at 2 trillion barrels, and the growth and decline 
rates are varied, the peak year is at some point 
between 2017 and 2036. The peak in global oil 
production can be pushed beyond 2040 only 
if demand grows very slowly and production 
declines very rapidly. These scenarios seem 
unlikely given the rapid rates of demand growth 
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associated with developing countries that are 
described above.
To sum up, global production of conventional 
crude oil may peak within the next 20 years. 
This limit is not simulated in either of the EIA 
or IEA models. There is therefore a considerable 
risk that resulting supply forecasts may overstate 
the amount of oil that can be delivered to the 
market – a marked distinction with respect to 
the fundamentals that prevailed in the 1980s, 
when oil prices dropped. 
Chart 21 The peak in global oil production 
according to the amount of remaining 
reserves
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Despite much discussion about alternative 
fuels, few currently appear to be fully 
economically viable. Against this 
background, and in the light of the prices 
currently envisioned and the structural 
impediments to their development, the 
likelihood is rather low that alternative fuels 
will meet a significant proportion of energy 
requirements any time soon. Model forecasts 
vary widely in this respect. Somewhere 
towards the middle of this range, the EIA 
forecasts that over the period 2005-30 global 
production of replacements for conventional 
crude oil will increase from 2.8 mbd to 
10.9 mbd (see Chart 22). The IEA forecast 
is slightly less optimistic in that it states 
that non-conventional sources of oil will 
contribute 9 mbd in 2030. The replacements 
include oil shale, sand-based extra-heavy 
oil and derivatives, such as synthetic crude 
products and liquids derived from coal and 
natural gas.
Although this represents a rather signiﬁ  cant 
increase, technical and economic constraints 
on production imply that these forecasts may 
overstate the amount of alternative fuels that 
will actually be delivered. And even if these 
amounts are realised, a peak in global oil 
production, as described above, would imply 
that producing a further 7 mbd over 25 years 
may not be sufﬁ  cient to ﬁ  ll the gap in demand. 
Again, both of these factors imply that oil prices 
are likely to continue to exceed the USD 70 to 
USD 90 range over the long term.
WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? 
Under the current technical and economic 
conditions, a wide array of energy sources can 
be considered alternative fuels. These include 
hydrogen,12 tar sands, oil shale, ethanol, 
electricity generated from nuclear ﬁ  ssion, 
windmills and photovoltaic cells. For this 
discussion – the impact of alternative fuels on oil 
prices – we focus on alternative fuels that could 
replace crude oil in the transportation sector. 
Existing technologies, such as the jet and internal 
combustion engines, as well as the mobile nature 
of the activity, necessitate liquid fuels. This 
restricts viable alternatives to (i) ethanol from 
biomass; (ii) unconventional fossil fuels, such as 
oil shale and tar sands; and (iii) technologies that 
convert natural gas or coal into liquids. 
Hydrogen is not really a source of energy – it is an energy carrier,  12 




Like conventional crude oil, alternative fuels are derived from solar energy that has been converted 
into chemical energy by biological organisms. Ethanol is produced from plants, both agricultural 
crops, such as corn or sugar cane, and natural vegetation, such as switchgrass and trees. Fossil fuels 
are generated from the partially decomposed remains of biological organisms that lived millions 
of years ago. These sources differ according to the amount of effort required to generate liquid 
Chart 22 Forecast for the production of 
unconventional liquid fuels 
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Large estimates for the reserves of alternative 
fuels overstate the potential of alternative fuels 
to replace conventional crude. Although the 
world currently produces 2-3 mbd of liquid 
alternatives, which represents about 4 percent 
of global demand, their production generally 
is not technically or economically viable. In 
the United States, ethanol production is highly 
subsidised, as is the production of tar sands in 
Canada (see Chart 23).
Estimates for the cost of producing alternative 
fuels, such as those shown in Chart 23, indicate 
that the production costs for many alternatives 
are well below the current price of crude oil, and 
the cost of producing oil shale, which is the most 
costly, is roughly equivalent to the current price 
of crude oil. Such values would seem to imply 
that oil prices should not rise and that they may 
decline back towards the cost of replacements 
for crude oil.
This is unlikely to occur because the dollar 
estimates for production costs are biased in a 
way that the true costs are understated.
It takes considerable amounts of energy to recover 
alternative fuels from the environment and convert 
into a usable form. This cost can be measured 
by a physical index, i.e. the energy return on 
investment, which represents the amount of 
energy obtained divided by the amount of energy 
used to obtain it. All alternatives to conventional 
crude oil have an energy return on investment that 
is considerably smaller than that of conventional 
crude oil. For example, estimates indicate that the 
energy return on investment of oil shale is about 
5:1 compared with about 15:1 for conventional 
crude oil produced in the United States. Even less 
favourable, the energy in ethanol produced from 
corn is approximately equal to the amount of 
energy used to grow and process the corn.
The fact that the energy return on investment for 
alternative fuels is less than that for conventional 
crude oil means that production costs are biased 
in such a way that they understate the price at 
which alternative fuels can compete economically 
with conventional crude oil. Since the production 
of alternative fuels is more energy-intensive than 
the production of conventional crude oil, their 
cost will go up with the price of conventional 
energy sources. Consequently, as the price 
of crude oil rises, so do the costs of producing 
alternatives, and these increases mean that the 
cost of producing alternative fuels continues 
to just exceed the price of conventional fuels. 
This effect is demonstrated by changes in the 
production costs for oil shale. After crude oil 
prices dropped in the 1980s, the production costs 
were estimated to be about USD 40 per barrel. 
As oil prices now exceed that level, newer 
calculations indicate that the production costs are 
close to USD 100 per barrel.
fuels. Over millions of years, geological energies convert the remnants of biological organisms into 
conventional crude oil. When these geological processes are truncated due to insufﬁ  cient temperature 
or pressure, the product is kerogen, which is the form of energy in tar sands or oil shale. Technologies 
to harness these fuels supplement geological energies by recovering and converting the kerogen into 
a liquid that can be reﬁ  ned like conventional crude oil. Living biomass can be converted into ethanol 
through human efforts alone, without the involvement of geological energy.
These fuels are available over various timescales and in various quantities. Fuels produced from 
current plant growth can be generated on a sustainable basis. However, because solar energy 
is diffuse and photosynthesis is inefﬁ  cient (about 0.3 percent of the solar energy that reaches a 
plant is converted to biomass), annual production of ethanol is limited. For example, converting 
the entire 2005 US corn crop to ethanol would have satisﬁ  ed only about 12 percent of the US 
demand for motor gasoline in 2005. Conversely, the geological resource base for oil shale and 
tar sands is considerable. For example, the US Geological Survey estimates that global oil shale 
resources constitute the equivalent of at least 2.8 trillion barrels of oil (Dyni (2005)).31
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Once the trigger price is exceeded, the capital 
intensity of alternative fuels creates lead times 
of 10-15 years (Hirsch et al. (2005)). In order 
for such fuels to be available in a timely fashion, 
considerable foresight is needed.
Box 4
HOTELLING’S MODEL: DEFINITIONS AND LIMITS
The foresight needed to overcome these long lead times is based on information generated by 
Hotelling’s model of non-renewable resource extraction (Hotelling, 1931). This model implies 
that ﬁ  rms use information about the quantity of recoverable oil, its cost of extraction, the demand 
curve for oil, etc. to maximise the net present value of rents (the price of oil minus its marginal 
extraction cost). 
W = B(q(0)) + B(q(1)) 1
(1+r)




)T ( +....+ B(q(T))
q(0) + q(1)_+ q(2)+....q(T) ≤ S
Chart 23 Production costs and carbon emissions for liquid fuels, both conventional and 
unconventional 
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THE ROLE OF PEAK PRODUCTION FOR 
INVESTMENT IN ALTERNATIVE FUELS
Arranging timely investment in alternative 
fuels, however, is complicated by several 
impediments, such as determining the date on 
which global oil production is likely to peak. If 
this could be pinpointed, ﬁ  rms would invest in 
an energy-producing infrastructure that would 
supply alternatives as of the peak. This optimal 
investment path would generate alternative 
sources of energy that would maximise proﬁ  ts 
for ﬁ  rms as well as total social welfare.
Uncertainty about the peak of oil production 
creates asymmetric outcomes for ﬁ  rms 
and society. Society prefers an investment 
schedule that generates alternative fuels 
prior to the expected date of the peak, while 
energy-producing  ﬁ   rms prefer an investment 
schedule that generates alternative fuels after 
the expected date of the peak (Kaufmann and 
Shiers (2008)).
This asymmetry complements the effect of the 
long adjustment period for energy investments. 
Econometric analyses indicate slow rates of 
error correction – 0.07 for oil production in the 
lower 48 states (Kaufmann and Cleveland 
(2001)) and 0.17 for US reﬁ  ning  capacity 
(Kaufmann, in review) – towards their long-run 
equilibrium.13 For example, the 0.07 rate of error 
correction would eliminate about 50 percent of 
the gap between the equilibrium and observed 
An error correction value of 0.07 implies that 7 percent of the  13 
difference between the equilibrium level of oil production 
indicated by oil prices and the observed level of oil prices is 
eliminated each year.
in which B(q(t)) is the sum of consumer and producer surplus in period t generated by the 
extraction of quantity q(t), r is the discount rate, and S is the total quantity of oil to be extracted.
If we make some assumptions about the costs of extraction (for example, they are constant over 
time), and take into account the size of the oil resource base, maximising total social welfare 
generates a very simple two-period case:
p(t) − c = [ p(t+1) − c] 1
1+r
) (
in which p is the price of oil and c is the cost of extraction. Solving for r generates the 
following:
[p(t)–c)]
[p(t +1– c) – (p(t) – c)]
=r
This is Hotelling’s rule, i.e. that rents earned from the production of a non-renewable resource, 
such as crude oil, should rise with the rate of interest, which can be used to generate optimal 
price and production paths. Anticipating changes indicated by these paths allows ﬁ  rms  to 
schedule investment that is required to produce alternative fuels in a timely fashion. Although 
intellectually attractive, there is little empirical evidence that ﬁ  rms can determine optimal paths. 
To rectify these inconsistencies, analysts have added real-world complexities, such as the 
difﬁ  culties of the exploration process, constraints on investment and capacity, ore quality and 
a host of market imperfections. These modiﬁ  cations improve the ability of Hotelling’s model 
to account for the historical record of the oil industry, but the resulting complexity makes the 
optimal production and price paths speciﬁ  c to the assumptions (Krautkraemer (1998)). As a 
result, there is considerable literature that indicates that Hotelling’s model cannot be used to 
project an accurate production path for conventional crude oil (Krautkraemer (1998)).33
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one-time increase in the price of crude oil.14 The 
longer lead times and technical immaturity of 
alternative fuel technologies may imply even 
slower rates of adjustment.
Compounding this effect, the skewed distribution 
of oil among ﬁ  elds is likely to delay a pre-peak 
increase in oil prices that would signal the need 
for alternatives. Most oil is found in a few very 
large  ﬁ   elds. Consequently, extraction costs 
may not increase signiﬁ  cantly until these ﬁ  elds 
are depleted and replaced with smaller ﬁ  elds 
further from the surface in more remote areas. 
The discontinuous change in extraction costs is 
illustrated by the production history in the lower 
48 states of the United States, where the real cost 
of producing oil remained steady or declined 
between 1936 and the late 1970s even as 
production tripled, but then real costs increased 
more than 4-fold within a decade as production 
declined after the peak (see Chart 16).
Such impediments to the production of 
alternative fuels become highly problematic as 
global production peaks. If global production of 
crude oil peaks and declines as shown in 
Chart 18, demand for alternative fuels will rise 
more rapidly than forecast by most models. This 
can be approximated by the difference between 
the production of conventional crude oil at the 
time of the peak and subsequent rates of 
production. The implied demand for alternative 
fuels reaches nearly 10 mbd, which is the current 
rate of crude oil production by Saudi Arabia ﬁ  ve 
to ten years after the peak, regardless of the 
amount of oil thought to remain, the growth rate 
of oil demand or the rate at which production 
declines.15
To illustrate this point, 93 percent of the difference between the  14 
equilibrium level of oil production indicated by oil prices and the 
observed level of oil prices remains after one year of adjustment. 
That gap is narrowed to about 86 percent (0.932) after two years 
of adjustment. After ten years (0.9310), about 48 percent of the 
gap remains.
Finally, regarding the long-term outlook, the role of technological  15 
progress may however also be underestimated. Incentives (price 
and legislative) are in place for technological progress that 
could increase energy efﬁ  ciency,  improve  ﬁ  eld  management 
(increase recovery rates), as well as increase the energy return 
on investment of alternative sources of energy, such as tar sands 
and oil shale.34
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7 CONCLUSION
Although there are similarities between current 
oil market developments and those during the 
1970s and 1980s, prices are not likely to decline 
signiﬁ  cantly and stabilise as they did from the 
mid-1980s through to 2000. Currently, structural 
changes in oil demand make it unlikely that high 
prices will reduce oil demand as they did during 
the 20-year period between 1978 and 1998 
through the substitution of coal and natural gas 
in the industrial and power-generating sectors. 
These sectors now account for a relatively small 
share of oil demand. Instead, there is greater oil 
demand in the transportation and non-energy 
sectors where substituting conventional forms of 
energy is considerably more difﬁ  cult and demand 
is more sensitive to income growth. Moreover, 
rapid economic development, particularly in 
emerging economies, implies that oil demand 
will grow more rapidly than forecasted by 
many models. Nor will oil demand be slowed 
signiﬁ  cantly by climate change policy, as these 
effects are likely to have the greatest impact on 
coal use.
The depletion of oil resources reduces the ability 
of higher oil prices to increase oil supply. Oil 
prices declined between the 1970s and the 1990s 
due to concurrent increases in non-OPEC oil 
production. Since 2000 their production growth 
has slowed and since 2004 output has declined. 
Slow growth (or absolute reductions) is (are) 
likely to continue because resource depletion 
causes production to decline in mature regions, 
such as the United States and the North Sea, and 
these reductions offset gains in newly opened 
regions, such as the Caspian Sea. Slow or no 
growth in non-OPEC production will probably be 
compounded by slow growth in OPEC capacity. 
Simulations indicate that signiﬁ  cant  increases 
in OPEC capacity reduce OPEC revenues by 
lowering prices by more than the gain in sales 
due to lower prices. This effect has been ignored 
by many forecasts that simply assume that 
OPEC will continue its role as swing producer, 
i.e. that OPEC will produce enough oil to make 
up the difference between global oil demand 
and non-OPEC production. Besides geological 
capacity, there are few economic incentives for 
OPEC to increase its capacity; a factor which is 
likely to have a structural impact on oil prices 
forwarding the future. 35
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